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THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE BIOETHICS MOVEMENT
SANDRA H. JOHNSON*
INTRODUCTION
The thirtieth anniversary of bioethics has sparked several histo-
ries.' Variously described as a movement,2 or a new discipline,3 or the
intersection of traditional disciplines such as law, medicine, and phi-
losophy,4 bioethics has largely enjoyed a life of reasoned debate as
befits the "principlism"5 that has thus far dominated this area of study.
The debate has been concentrated among professionals, taking place
within professional and academic literature, within professional and
* Professor of Law, Center for Health Law Studies, St. Louis University School of
Law, and Associate Professor of Law in Internal Medicine, St. Louis University School of
Medicine.
1. See, e.g., Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec.
1993, at S1 (including papers presented at a "thirtieth anniversary" celebration); Albert R.
Jonsen, Theological Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Public Discourse, 4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1
(1994) (describing the historic roles of theology and philosophy in the development of
public moral discourse);John C. Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Commit-
tees, 50 MD. L. REv. 859, 866 (1991) (offering a historical perspective on the bioethics
movement); Jay Katz, "Ethics and Clinical Research" Revisited. A Tribute to Henry K Beecher,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 31 (providing a personal history); George J.
Annas, Ethics Committees: From Ethical Comfort to Ethical Cover, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-
June 1991, at 18 (providing a short history of ethics committees). See generaly DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAw AND BIoETHIcs TRANS-
FORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAING (1991).
2. See e.g., Edmund D. Pelligrino et al., Future Directions in Clinical Ethics, 2 J. CUNICAL
ETHICS 5, 5 (1991) ("We have chosen to make projections for the next two decades-a
period roughly equal to the entire history of the modem biomedical ethics movement in
America."); ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 243; Jonsen, supra note 1, at S2 (discussing the
characterization of bioethics as a movement).
3. See Barbara C. Thorton et al., Education: Expanding the Circle of Participants, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 26 (referring to bioethics as a discipline).
4. See, e.g., K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics and Philosophy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-
Dec. 1993, at SIO (noting that other disciplines approach moral problems from their own
perspectives).
5. "Principlism" describes an approach to ethical reasoning that first specifies and
then analyzes in application principles of ethical behavior. See generally Tom L. BEAUCHAMP
& JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1983). Principles commonly
identified in relation to bioethics include autonomy, beneficence, truth-telling, and justice.
Id. Principalism's dominance is often attributed to the 1976 book Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, authored by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. But see Tom L.
Beauchamp, The Principles Approach, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at S9 (identify-
ing the Belmont Report, produced by the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects, as an earlier and more influential principlist statement).
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scholarly commissions,6 and within institutional ethics committees
and review boards, both dominated by the professionals who are to be
guided by them.7
Legislation addressing bioethics has not controlled the develop-
ment of the law during most of these first decades. Despite their calls
for legislative assistance,' courts, as opposed to legislatures, thus far
have had the most apparent and dominant influence on the substan-
tive law.
Although the media covers bioethics generously,9 seldom have
decisionmaking and policymaking escaped the confines of ultimate
professional control. While questions of biomedical ethics are no
longer the province of physicians alone, the methods established to
deal with such questions rarely involve the participation of the general
public, patients, or subjects.10 To the extent that physicians may no
longer make the most difficult treatment decisions alone, institutional
ethics committees have stepped in to share in the decisionmaking. 11
Institutional review boards decide questions concerning human ex-
perimentation. 2 Because bioethics is essentially a movement towards
personal choice and autonomy 3 and driven, if not created, by public
6. The roles of bioethics commissions are discussed in George J. Annas, Will the Real
Bioethics (Commission) Please Stand Up?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 19, and in
Alexander M. Capron, Is It Time to Clone a Bioethics Commission?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 29.
7. For a recent critique of the professional domination of institutional review boards,
see Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7 (1993). For a
critique of the lack of attention to procedures respectful of the patient's role, see Susan M.
Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Caring, 50 MD. L.
REv. 798 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (noting
that the Florida legislature has failed to adopt suitable legislation in the area of refusal of
medical treatment), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
9. See generally Linda Roach Monroe, How Can We Trust Science if Findings Change
Daily?, MiAMI HERALD, Oct. 18, 1992, at 1J; Diane Lore, Media Provide Key That Opens Money
Chests, THE STATE, Jan. 28, 1992, at ID.
10. There are, of course, exceptions-including, for example, the recent referenda on
assisted suicide in Washington and California. For a discussion of the Washington and
California referenda, see Maria T. CeloCruz, Aid-In-Dying: Should We Decriminalize Physician
Assisted Suicide and Physician Committed Euthanasia?, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 369 (1992). For a
discussion of the California assisted suicide referendum, see Leslie Berkman, 0. C. in Middle
of Death With Dignity'Debate, L.A. TiMEs, Oct. 4, 1992, at Al; Paul Jacobs & Virginia Ellis,
Prp. 165 and Right-to-Die Measure Trail, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1992, at Al.
11. See Annas, supra note 1, at 18-19.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, Why America Accepted Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1993, at S8; ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 243.
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interest in the work of doctors and scientists," it is remarkable that
bioethics continues to be so professionally dominated.
Marking the stages of intellectual history is a risky business espe-
cially when attempted in such close proximity to the events studied.
One of the interesting aspects of the new bioethics histories, for exam-
ple, is their disagreement over the movement's birthdate. Some ar-
gue that bioethics came into being with the publication of the Life
magazine article on Seattle's. "God Committee";15 others claim that
Henry Beecher's expos6 on experimentation sparked the move-
ment;" still others maintain that the Quinlan case' 7 or other events i s
mark the birthdate of bioethics. Despite the hazards, classifying devel-
opments by stages can be a functional method for analyzing change.
I. QUNLAV To CRUZAN
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Quinlan is best
known for establishing that withdrawal of medical treatment, even
when death is expected to result, is legally permissible under some
circumstances. 19 It is also known for being the midwife of ethics com-
14. See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, What Bioethics Brought to the Public, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Nov.-Dec. 1993, at S14; see also Robert M. Veatch, From Forgoing Life Support to Aid-in-Dying
HASTINGS CENTER RP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at S7 (noting that the Quinlan case "became the
symbol of the fact that the debate over decisions to cease life support was going public"
and beyond interdisciplinary professional study groups and projects).
15. Shana Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, LIFE, Nov. 1962, at 103. Albert
Jonsen, among others, identified the publication date of Alexander's article as the
birthdate of the bioethics movement. See, e.g., Jonsen, supra note 1, at SI (discussing the
Life article's impact on bioethics). But seeJudith P. Swazey, But Was It Bioethics, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at S5-6 (arguing that the Life article occurred in "the pre-
bioethics era").
16. Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354-60
(1966). David Rothman identified the publication of Beecher's article as a critical point in
the development of bioethics. ROTHmAN, supra note 1, at 3. Jay Katz describes his and
Beecher's work in human experimentation as existing prior to the "flowering" of the field
of bioethics. Katz, supra note 1, at 31.
17. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976); see, e.g.,Jonsen, supra note 1, at S3 (acknowledging that some consider the
date Quinlan was decided as the bioethics movement's birthdate).
18. See, e.g., Warren T. Reich, How Bioethics Got Its Name, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-
Dec. 1993, at S6 (marking the coining of the term "bioethics" as the birthdate of the field);
StanleyJ. Reiser, View the Third, HASTiNGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at S13-14 (identify-
ing the letter of Pope Pius XII concerning the use of ventilators, published in 1957, as the
"beginning of the modem biomedical ethics movement").
19. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
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mittees, 20 although the current role for such committees is signifi-
cantly broader than the specific charge by the court in Quinlan.21
Studying the Quinlan court's decision from the perspective of cur-
rent controversies in bioethics is like going back to the future. For
example, in Quinlan, the court discussed at length whether Karen
Quinlan, who was in what is now called a persistent vegetative state,
was actually dead or alive. 2 At the time that Quinlan was decided,
anyone involved in teaching lawyers, doctors, or other health care pro-
fessionals about the law of life-sustaining treatment knew that the first
task was to make clear that Karen Quinlan was not dead according to
contemporary medical and legal norms. During this period, the de-
termination of death statutes were recent developments in most
states. 21 Soon after Quinlan, whole-brain death was widely adopted as
the appropriate legal standard for the determination of death and
seemed firmly established.24 Currently, however, the legal standard
for the determination of death is once again a controversial topic.
Some argue that irreversible cessation of higher brain function, which
occurs in the persistent vegetative state, constitutes death.25 Others
contend that anencephaly also should be included in the legal defini-
tion of death." At least two states now require accommodation of
religious objections to the whole-brain death standard. Under this
20. See Annas, supra note 1, at 18-19.
21. The Quinlan court, relying upon a proposal made in a law review article, directed
Karen Quinlan's physicians to consult with the hospital's Ethics Committee. Quinlan, 355
A.2d at 668-69 (citing Karen Teel, The Physician's Dilemma. A Doctor's View: What The Law
Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9 (1975)). If the Committee agreed that there was no
reasonable possibility of Quinlan's emerging from the coma, treatment could be with-
drawn without the threat of civil or criminal liability. Id. at 671-72.
22. Id. at 652-55.
23. Promulgation of whole brain death statutes occurred after publication of the Report
of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death: A
Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85 (1968). For a review of early statutory efforts,
see Alexander M. Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determin-
ing Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal 121 U. PA. L. Rv. 87 (1972).
24. For a discussion of the adoption of brain death legislation, see BARRY R. FuRROW ET
AL., BioETHics: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHics 193-200 (1991).
25. See. e.g., Robert M. Veatch, The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of
Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,July-Aug. 1993, at 18 (discussing the difficulties inherent in a
"whole-brain oriented" definition of death).
26. See, e.g., In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 594-95 (Fla. 1992) (considering and re-
jecting the claim that an anencephalic infant with some brain stem function was brain
dead).
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-5 (West Supp. 1993) requires the physician to use cardio-
respiratory criteria, as opposed to neurological criteria, to determine death if the physician
has reason to believe, based on information in the patient's record or provided by some-
one familiar with the patient's religious beliefs, that using the neurological criteria would
violate the patient's religious beliefs. New York public health regulations also require phy-
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standard, the question of whether or not one is dead, in certain cir-
cumstances, becomes a matter of personal choice.
The Quinlan court also reviewed the admissibility of statements
made by Karen Quinlan prior to her injury relating to her treatment
preferences.28 The court recounted that, while she was competent,
Quinlan had verbalized "her distaste for continuance of life by ex-
traordinary medical procedures, under circumstances not unlike
those of the present case." 9 Although the court did not overturn the
trial court's admission of the statements, the court voiced its skepti-
cism: "[W] e agree with the ... trial court that such statements, since
they were remote and impersonal, lacked significant probative
weight."30 This early skepticism concerning a patient's prior state-
ments is noteworthy, in light of the recent critiques of the substituted
judgment standard and its basis in the autonomy of the individual.3 "
Quinlan, and the long line of cases up to the point of Cruzan,
established a legal framework for decisionmaking concerning life-sus-
taining treatment. This framework allowed discontinuation or with-
holding of medical treatment when justified under either a
substituted judgment standard (generally relying, though not always,
on some evidence of the formerly competent patient's putative
choice) or under the best interests standard (balancing the benefits
and burdens of treatment if evidence of the patient's choice was
lacking) .3
Despite the Quinlan court's early skepticism, a patient's prior
statements concerning treatment preferences were routinely given
preferential consideration after Quinlan."3 In cases in which evidence
of the patient's choice was lacking, and in which the courts relied on
sicians to accommodate individual preferences when determining whether death has oc-
curred. See Charlotte K. Goldberg, Choosing Life After Death: Respecting Religious Beliefs and
Moral Convictions in Near Death Decisions, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1197, 1201 & n.25 (1988).
28. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affid sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188,
618 A.2d 744 (1993).
32. See, e.g., THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDEUNES ON THE TERMINATION OF LiFE-Sus-
TAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (1987); GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT
DECISIONMAMING IN LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDic.A TREATMENT CASES (1993).
33. It might be said that the Massachusetts Supreme Court case Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 728 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), with its reliance on a
substituted judgement standard in allowing treatment to be foregone for a severely men-
tally retarded adult, actually influenced the courts in other states on this point more signifi-
candy than the earlier and more well-known Quinlan case.
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the best interests of the patient, the presence or absence of pain was
often a determining factor.34 The role of the family varied, with some
courts viewing the family primarily as a source of evidence about the
choices of the patient and other courts according it more substantial
deference.35 While it was most common to require clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the formerly competent patient's choice, there was
significant variation in the courts' views of what constituted clear and
convincing evidence.36 There was no variation, however, in the view
that advocacy of nontreatment bore the burden of proof. In addition,
the courts were consistent in concluding that the "state's interests" in
these cases did not require life-sustaining medical treatment for in-
competent terminally ill, seriously debilitated or permanently uncon-
scious patients. 7
Legislation enacted during this early post-Quinlan period focused
almost entirely on enabling individuals to memorialize their treat-
ment choices in a legal instrument. This paralleled the courts' prefer-
ence for evidence of the patient's choice. The first form of these
documents, the living will, was of limited use: the vast majority of per-
sons would not use such documents; and they were simply inadequate
in responding to the range of medical conditions under which surro-
gate decisionmaking is required or to the range of treatment deci-
sions that arise. Such legislation did confirm, however, that
nontreatment was legally permissible under certain circumstances,
and for its time, that was a significant supplement to the case law.
II. AFTER CR'LJZAN
The Cruzan38 decision marks a turning point with respect to legis-
lation concerning life-sustaining treatment. Although it would be an
overstatement to say that Cruzan caused a shift in the legislation, it
certainly influenced its timing. Cruzan, with its contemporary
34. See, e.g., In reConroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985), establishing a "pure-objective test"
that, in the absence of evidence of the patient's choice, would allow withdrawal of treat-
ment in cases where the patient was experiencing pain.
35. For a discussion of the role of family members and the standards to be used for
family and other surrogates, see Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in Life-Sus-
taining Medical Treatment Cases (2d ed. 1993) at 71-81. See also In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434,
451 (N.J. 1987) ("Our legal system cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be
borne by the patient, those caring for the patient, and those who care about the patient.").
36. See discussion of burden of proof in BARRY R. FuRtow ET AL., BIOETHiCS, HEALTH
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 301-02 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977).
38. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), affid sub nom. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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O'Connor5 9 in New York,4° were the first high-profile cases to reject the
family's unanimous decision to discontinue treatment for a previously
competent adult, breaking the custom developed after Quinlan.41 Ob-
viously, Cruzan stands apart as the first case concerning the refusal of
life-sustaining treatment to be reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court, after nearly fifteen years of case law in the state and federal
courts. Both the Missouri Supreme Court and United States Supreme
Court decisions in Cruzan helped shape the landscape of state legisla-
tion concerning life-sustaining treatment.
The majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court rebelled
against the generally accepted legal framework for the withdrawal of
life-sustaining medical treatment. It rejected the notion of unquali-
fied autonomy for incompetent patients in regard to treatment deci-
sions,42 the characterization of medically provided nutrition and
hydration as medical treatment,43 and any preferential decisionmak-
ing role for the patient's family. 44 The court asserted that Missouri's
state interest was distinct from other states' interests. Missouri's inter-
est required life-sustaining medical treatment, especially nutrition and
hydration, for patients in a persistent vegetative state who had not left
formal instructions regarding treatment choices.45
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this decision, though
the Court reduced the Missouri opinion to the least radical proposi-
tion; that is, that Missouri required clear and convincing evidence of
the patient's treatment choices. The ChiefJustice's decision in Cruzan
appears to be a work of compromise designed to attract the votes
needed to form a majority on the result. A key vote apparently be-
longed to Justice O'Connor, who wrote her own concurring opinion
to emphasize some points reserved by the Rehnquist opinion, includ-
39. In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
40. The New York Court of Appeals, in one of its first cases on life-sustaining treat-
ment, drew different lines on life-sustaining treatment In In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.
1981), the court ordered treatment for a severely mentally retarded adult over the request
of his mother. Storar had bladder cancer, and the blood transfusions at issue would not
cure the cancer but would maintain his blood level during his remaining months of life.
The court rejected a substituted judgment standard for the never-competent patient and
ordered this "life-saving" treatment.
41. For a comparison and analysis of the New York and Missouri cases, see Sandra H.
Johnson, From Medicalization to Legalization to Politicization: O'Connor, Cruzan and Refusal of
Treatment in the 1990s, 21 CoNN. L. REv. 685 (1989).
42. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419-22.
43. Id. at 423.
44. Id. at 425-26.
45. Id. at 426.
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ing a possible constitutionally protected status for patient-designated
proxies.46
The tentativeness of the United States Supreme Court majority
opinion has limited its influence on subsequent cases. In fact, neither
the analysis developed by the Missouri Supreme Court nor that of the
United States Supreme Court has altered the course of the case law
regarding life-sustaining treatment in any significant way thus far.
With only a rare exception,"' the cases occurring after Cruzan contin-
ued to allow withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment based either on
the familiar substituted judgment or best interests standards.4"
The significance of Cruzan is in the legislation that it spawned.
On the federal level, Senators from Missouri and New York cospon-
sored the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA). 49 The PSDA re-
quires covered health care providers to ask patients whether they have
advance directives."0
The most significant legislative activity, however, has occurred at
the state level. As discussed more extensively in this symposium, after
Cruzan, several states enacted legislation providing for the durable
power of attorney for health care, which allows competent adults to
designate a proxy decisionmaker for health care decisions. Although
some states had adopted such statutes prior to Cruzan,51 the Cruzan
Court's rejection of the family's unanimous treatment choice andJus-
46. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
47. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993). See also Karen L. Goldmeier,
Comment, The Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Recent Changes in Maryland
Law, 53 MD. L. REv. 1306 (1994).
48. This is true even in Missouri. On remand, the probate court in Cruzan ordered
treatment discontinued based on the submission of more evidence of conversations con-
cerning treatment preferences with the patient prior to her injury. In addition, the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals has held that the Missouri Cruzan decision is to be limited to the
provision of nutrition and hydration and that the best interests standard allows for the
refusal of cardiopulmonary resuscitation by a surrogate. In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263
(Mo. App. 1993). See also In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992); In re Doe, 583 N.W.2d
1263 (Mass.), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Gross, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992).
49. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, P.L. No. 101-508, § 4751, 104 Stat.
1388-204 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)).
50. For a discussion of the operation of the PSDA, see The Patient Self-Determination Act,
2 J. CUJNIC.AL ETHICS 172 (1991); Special Section: Practicing the PSDA, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 172-212.
51. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (originally enacted
in 1983); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-501 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) (originally enacted
in 1973 and amended to specifically include medical decisionmaking in 1983). Statutory
durable powers of attorney not designed specifically for health care decisions were being
used for health care decisionmaking. See Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make
Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 985, 1015-25 (1984) (discussing the enactment
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tice O'Connor's invitation in her concurring opinion,52 prompted
many more states to enact durable power of attorney legislation."
The durable power of attorney or patient-designated proxy repre-
sents a decided improvement over the living will.54 But only a minor-
ity of people execute durable powers of attorney or other advance
directives.
In light of this public resistance to advance directives, several
states have enacted legislation that represents a third stage (after liv-
ing wills and designated proxies) in legislation addressing decisions
about life sustaining treatment. These more recent surrogate consent
statutes authorize specific parties to make health care decisions for
incompetent patients in the absence of advance directives. 5
The Cruzan decision demonstrated that a family's authority to
make medical treatment decisions for an incompetent family member
was legally insecure and required specific legal recognition. The sur-
rogate-consent statutes specifically authorize what some claim always
to have been the actual practice in health care institutions before
Cruzan.5 6
III. BEYOND CRUZAN
There are clear signs that point to significant change in the field
of bioethics. Three substantial changes include: (1) a shift in the ba-
sic paradigm; (2) an increase in public debate, political compromise,
and direct democracy; and (3) the reassertion of both physician and
of durable power of attorney legislation and its use in delegating medical decisionmaking
responsibilities).
52. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Catherine J. Barrie, Legislative History of Missouri Senate Bill 148, Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 453, 454 (1992).
54. For a further delineation of this position, see Susan R. Martyn & Lynn B. Jacobs,
Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ilk The Living Will and Durable Power of Attor-
ney, 63 NEB. L. REv. 779 (1984); Fowler, supra note 51, at 1000-05; Sandra H. Johnson,
SequentialDomination, Autonomy and Living Wills, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 113, 133-34 (1987).
55. See, e.g., Am CODE ANN., § 20-17-214 (Michie 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
571 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-7-8.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.635 (1990); TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 135.00 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107 (1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993).
56. See, e.g., Judith Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained from Families of Adult Pa-
tients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258JAMA 229, 234 (1987). The President's Com-
mission recommended deference to the family as the norm. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SuSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL,
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 127-28 (1983).
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social control over decisionmaking, especially in regard to treatment
decisions with noticeable allocative effects.
The dominant paradigm in the first two decades of bioethics was
"principlism."5 7 Principlism provided a framework and a vocabulary
that were quite compatible with judicial decisionmaking. This para-
digm is criticized, however, for being unduly limiting and abstract.
58
It also is criticized for its emphasis on patients' autonomy.59 Clearly
the advance directive legislation60 emerges from adherence to an au-
tonomy theory, although the cases have often included a considera-
tion of the best interests of the patient.6"
Other paradigms for bioethics have been gaining strength.6 2 For
example, studies regarding the impact of culture on decisionmaking
call into question the broad acceptance of autonomy-based princi-
ples.63 Similarly, the communitarian paradigm has shifted the focus
from the autonomy of the individual to the community.6 4 Finally,
there is growing concern regarding medical decisions based on rights
alone, rather than in conjunction with "moral principles."65
The marriage of political action and bioethics has also expanded
the forum for bioethics. Bioethics has always been at the forefront of
broad public interest. Increasingly, bioethics has involved political ac-
57. See supra note 5 (discussing principlism).
58. For example, as a key part of the "rationalist" approach to ethics, principlism is
subject to criticism for excluding emotions. See, e.g., Sidney Callahan, The Role of Emotion in
Ethical Decisionmaking, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June-July 1988, at 9.
59. See Symposium, Autonomy-Paternalism-Community, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1984, at 5 (discussing the claims of the community versus the autonomous rights of
the individual); see alsoJAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD or DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); Jay
Katz, On Touching "The Happy Isles": Reflections about Past, Future, and Present, 17 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 110 (1989) (urging a broader conceptualization of autonomy).
60. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (describing the use of an ethics
committee to decide whether to withdraw life sustaining support).
62. For a discussion of other approaches, see generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Meta-
morphosis of Medical Ethics: A 30-Year Retrospective, 269 JAMA 1158 (1993) (describing a
.metamorphosis in medical ethics" that began with the "Quiescent Period," and progressed
to the "Period of Principlism," which was followed by a "Period of Antiprinciplism" and
concluded with a "Period of Crisis").
63. See, e.g., Special Section: Cultural Differences in Bioethics, 4J. CLINICAL ETHICS 134-42
(1993).
64. See, e.g., Jeffrey Blustein, The Family in Medical Decisionmaking, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., May-June 1993, at 6 (discussing the conflict between autonomy and
communitarianism).
65. See, e.g., John Ladd, Legalism and Medical Ethics, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN
MEDICINE 65-69 (John Arras & Nancy Rhoden eds., 3d ed. 1989) (discussing the relation-
ship between the legal and moral aspects of bioethics).
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tion. The assisted suicide referenda in Washington66 and California 67
are illustrative of such political exercises. Grassroots movements at-
tempting to set standards for allocation decisions evidence a broader
public base for bioethics. a Political action, coupled with increased
public control over the prevailing norms in bioethics, 69 present signif-
icant challenges to "business as usual" in bioethics.
Finally, the question of health care allocation or rationing
promises to expand bioethics beyond the focus on the individual med-
ical treatment decision. 70 The Quinlan-to-Cruzan era addressed
whether the discontinuation or withholding of treatment was legally
permissible and whether a surrogate had the authority to make the
treatment decision on behalf of an incompetent patient.71 This in-
quiry necessarily implicated the concern that surrogates might act too
quickly or out of self-interest.72 In the light of this concern, the law
presumed that treatment must continue unless the surrogate met a
substantial burden of proving that an exception should be made.73
The question facing the legal and medical communities at this
time, however, is to what extent the decision to withhold or to con-
tinue treatment should remain a matter of personal choice.7'4 The
66. Ballot Initiative 119 (1991) (referendum that would have legalized assisted suicide
and euthanasia in Washington state).
67. Ballot Initiative 161 (1992) (referendum that would have legalized doctor-assisted
suicide in California).
68. See, e.g., Bruce Jennings, A Grassroots Movement in Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Special Supp., June/July 1988; Diane M. Gianelli, One Community Looks for Consensus on
"Futile Care,"AM. MED. NEws, Sept. 20, 1993, at 1.
69. Political action, political compromise, and public "control" are distinguishable
from the "public moral discourse" described by AlbertJonsen and engaged in by bioethics
commissions. Albert R. Jonsen, Theological Ethics, Moral Philosophy, and Public Moral Dis-
course, 4 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 3 (1994).
70. Bioethics has been criticized for concentrating on the physician-patient relation-
ship and neglecting the larger community interest in furthering justice in health care deci-
sionmaking. See Renee Fox, Advance Medical Technology-Social and Ethical Implications, 2
ANN. REv. Soc. 231-68 (1976).
71. See discussion supra Part I.
72. See Areen, supra note 56, at 232-33 (discussing the possibility that families may make
decisions out of ignorance or bad faith).
73. See supra note 27.
74. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Henne-
pin Co., June 28, 1991) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order) (deciding
whether it was in the best interest of an elderly woman who is comatose, gravely ill, and
ventilator-dependent to have her husband of 53 years or a stranger make her medical care
decisions for her); In re Baby "K", 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that under the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act a hospital must provide emergency stabiliz-
ing treatment).
6MARYLAND LAW REvIEw
debate over medical futility75 highlights the social element of medical
treatment decisions and calls for some degree of social or physician
control over such decisions. How the surrogate-consent statutes, con-
firming and strengthening the customary role of kith and kin in mak-
ing treatment decisions for incompetents, will influence the legal
issues presented by this powerful question remains to be seen. In light
of the new pressures on health care allocation, the individual rights
approach probably will not survive as the dominant legally recognized
method for treatment decisionmaking. The challenge to bioethics is
to move beyond the bedside and beyond the physician-patient dyad
while maintaining the patient-centered moral aspect of treatment
decisions.
Although legislatures have addressed some questions of access to
medical care, they have not tackled the issues raised in this generation
of allocation decisions. For instance, state statutes governing access to
medical care have focused almost entirely on access to emergency
treatment.76 The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor
Act likewise protects only a limited right to emergency care.77 The
recent Baby "K' case reveals the inadequacy of such legislation in
light of the futility debate. Unfortunately, the federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes79 will not resolve the question of medical futility,
although they do establish important minimum boundaries for
rationing.
CONCLUSION: A DIRECTION FOR Fu-ruRE SCHOLARSHIP
Almost all of the scholarship on the law of bioethics has concen-
trated entirely on statutory and case law, the most easily accessible
sources of law, but clearly a limited universe.8' Thoughtful critique of
legislation and case law undoubtedly makes a contribution to the de-
75. The academic and professional literature on medical futility is already massive. For
a good description of the issues and a variety of definitions of medical futility, see Sympo-
sium, Medical Futility, 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 307 (1992).
76. See, e.g., N.Y. PuR. HEALTH LAw § 2805-b(1) (McKinney 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, § 449.8(a) (1993). For an excellent analysis of the duty to provide emergency treat-
ment under state law, see Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the Legal Duty
to Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REv. 21 (1989).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d) (1988).
78. In re Baby UK", 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
79. See, e.g., Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
80. There have been some notable exceptions to the focus on case law, including the
controversy and action surrounding the Baby Doe regulations litigated in Bowen v. American
Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
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velopment of law in this area. Health care delivery is a highly regu-
lated enterprise, however, whether it occurs in a private medical office
or in state-licensed and federally reimbursed health care facilities.
Statutory developments on the state level often produce state adminis-
trative regulations, a source of law that has in the past been difficult to
research. Neglecting such administrative regulation, however, results
in ignorance of the sources of law that have the most direct and effec-
tive influence on provider behavior."' To the extent that bioethics
provides a critique of the law and of attorneys advising health care
providers, bioethics must analyze the entire legal environment, includ-
ing rulemaking by administrative agencies and adjudication by profes-
sional and institutional licensure and certification agencies.
Moreover, if experience is any guide to the future, questions of
rationing health care are more likely to be resolved within a bureau-
cracy rather than by courts or legislatures. Just as bioethics will move
beyond the bedside, legal scholarship on bioethics must move beyond
the confines of statutory and case law if it is to remain a relevant influ-
ence in medical treatment decisionmaking.
81. The most well-known example of deference to an administrative system is the role
established for the New Jersey Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly in In re Con-
roy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). In Conroy, the Supreme Court of NewJersey required that
the Office of the Ombudsman receive notification whenever a nursing home contemplates
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from an elderly, incompetent resident. To execute
the court's mandate, the first ombudsman issued a letter to nursing homes announcing
that his office would investigate every case in which life-sustaining treatment might be with-
held and that facilities should hold in-service training to avoid "possible fines, professional
censure and other serious penalties." Letter from Hector Rodriguez, Aug. 30, 1988. In a
report to the New Jersey Commission on Legal and Ethical Problems in the Delivery of
Health Care, the ombudsman stated that those who desired to prevent the deterioration
and death of the elderly would not oppose such an aggressive program. A subsequent
ombudsman, in contrast to the first, promulgated rules that defined "abuse" as providing
medical treatment after a competent resident has made a voluntary and informed choice
to terminate treatment. Using the limited scope of judicial review traditionally accorded
administrative rulemaking, a NewJersey appellate court upheld the definition in Gleason
v. Abrams, 593 A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). Other illustrations of the im-
pact and latitude enjoyed by administrative agencies exist. See, e.g., Clarence J. Sundram,
Informed Consent for Major Medical Treatment of Mentally Disabled People, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1368 (1988) (describing an administrative "surrogate decisionmaking committee," estab-
lished in New York to make medical treatment decisions for incompetent patients for
whom no other surrogate was available, which did not require clear and convincing evi-
dence of the patient's choice); Rob Carson, Rule Lets Aid Crews Defy Living Wil, TACOMA
NEws Tins., Mar. 7, 1993, at BI; Carol M. Ostrom, Health Dept. Will Stand Behind Tougher
"No-CPR" Rules, SEA=-r TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, at A8 (describing the Washington state
health department's restrictive regulations concerning the availability of "no-CPR"
bracelets).
